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LEGISLATIVE  GRIDLOCK  AND
NONPARTISAN STAFF
George K. Yin*
INTRODUCTION
In a recent book, former Congressman Mickey Edwards blames much of
the gridlock in Congress on the political parties because of their influence
over both the electoral process and legislative governance.  To address the
latter issue, he would revise various congressional rules and procedures
(including the Senate filibuster and the role of the House Rules Committee)
and institute nonpartisan selection of leadership, committees, and commit-
tee staff in Congress.1  This Essay considers his last suggestion—use of non-
partisan professional committee staff—separate from his other proposals.
While his other ideas may have merit, they would require reversal of long-
standing traditions in Congress.2  In contrast, up until around 1970, the exis-
 2013 George K. Yin.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Edwin S. Cohen Distinguished Professor of Law and Taxation and Thomas F.
Bergin Teaching Professor, University of Virginia.  Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT), 2003–05.  This Essay contributes to a symposium on
legislative gridlock held at the Notre Dame Law School in November 2012.  The views
expressed should not be attributed to the JCT or its staff.  My thanks to Tom Barthold, Ken
Kies, and symposium participants for their comments on an earlier draft, and to David
Ashner and Roma Nandwani for their excellent research assistance.
1 See MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE 91–128 (2012).  His recom-
mendation for nonpartisan staff echoes a similar call from a Congressman a century ear-
lier, but is contrary to a proposal of an influential committee of the American Political
Science Association in the middle of the twentieth century. See SAMUEL W. MCCALL, THE
BUSINESS OF CONGRESS 59 (1911) (arguing that the “vast amount of information [needed
by Congress] should not be collected by organs entirely partisan”); Am. Political Sci. Ass’n,
Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee of Political Parties, 44 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 1, 8–9, 63–64 (1950) (urging stronger party control of
Congress, committees, and committee staff).  Edwards also offers various proposals to
reduce party influence over the electoral process. See EDWARDS, supra, at 35–87.
2 See GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 128, 134–36
(1961) (reporting “embryonic party organization in the House as early as 1790,” and
marked increase in party influence and powers of Speaker of the House beginning in
1890); 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 285 (Russell & Russell
1960) (1938) (describing party control of Senate committee system dating back to 1846).
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tence of nonpartisan professional committee staff was more the rule rather
than the exception in Congress.  Further, Congress currently delegates
important legislative tasks to nonpartisan professionals and has done so for
many years.  In addition, the significant role staff plays in the legislative pro-
cess is well-recognized.  Thus, a change to nonpartisan professional commit-
tee staff might be an idea that could be effected in the near term and have
some impact on legislative outcomes.
Part I provides background on the principal nonpartisan professional
staffs in Congress, past and present.  It describes the use of nonpartisan pro-
fessionals by the committees and a number of legislative support organiza-
tions.  Part II then explores the impact of nonpartisan professional
committee staff on legislative gridlock.  It first sketches out a “theoretical
case” for why such staff might help reduce gridlock.  The case is premised on
nonpartisan staff having an expertise distinct from that of partisans, and suffi-
cient influence in Congress to effect legislative outcomes.  The remainder of
Part II then raises several questions about this theoretical case, including
whether the required “expertise” and “influence” of nonpartisan staff are, to
some extent, incompatible.
Before we begin, a few cautionary notes.  The role of political parties in
Congress is sometimes explained as a way to make the legislative process
more efficient.  Members of the same party are thought to have certain pre-
existing relationships that can be drawn upon to help negotiate and produce
legislative outcomes.  Under this view, parties help to reduce the transaction
costs of legislating.3  Diminishing the role of the parties in Congress could,
therefore, make legislative solutions more costly and even harder to attain.
Moreover, increased party influence in Congress (and the greater cen-
tralization of power that often accompanies it) has generally operated in the
past to counter the decentralizing effect of the committee system (another
labor-saving device used by Congress).4  Reduced importance of the parties
in Congress, therefore, could result in strengthened committees and sub-
committees.  Yet strong committees (and the seniority system) have them-
selves been blamed in the past for producing legislative stalemate.5  Thus,
3 See CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 83–84 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sulli-
van eds., 1987).
4 See C. LAWRENCE EVANS & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS UNDER FIRE 85–86, 129–31
(1997) (explaining trade-off); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN
BRANCH 45 (2006) (same); BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS 126–27 (2006) (describing
impact of party leadership on House committees after 1994 election); Craig D. Margolis,
House Out of Order: Committee Reform in the Modern House of Representatives, 11 J.L. & POL. 273,
273–76 (1995); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative
Trade-off, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 461, 478–81 (1988).
5 See SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 67–109 (describing reasons for and consequences of R
changes in the House between the era of committee government in the 1950s and the
current, party-controlled era); David W. Rohde, Committees and Policy Formulation, in THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 201, 201–07, 213–16 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005)
(same).  Changes in the Senate have evolved somewhat differently, in part because of that
chamber’s counter-majoritarian rules. See SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 185–233. R
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even if Edwards is correct that party control over congressional governance
somehow contributes to gridlock, it is not clear that the default arrangement
(if party influence is reduced) would be an improvement.6
In addition, although this Essay concerns the use of staff in Congress, it
takes no position on what the proper role of staff should be.  Some have
questioned, for example, whether the prominence of staff activities and influ-
ence is consistent with principles of representative democracy.7  This Essay
simply accepts as a given the role staff plays, and explores whether the
unelected nature of staff might provide some advantage to help Congress
overcome the forces causing gridlock.
Finally, this Essay also assumes, without passing judgment on, the under-
lying premise of this symposium—the existence of gridlock in Congress.  The
remarkable lack of productivity of the nation’s divided government during
the just-completed 112th Congress (2011–2012)—complete with a frantic,
ludicrous effort at the very end of the Congress to unwind mechanisms the
same legislature had created earlier to force itself to act on fiscal matters—
nevertheless followed a two-year period of much greater legislative productiv-
ity (when control of government was unified under one party and the coun-
try faced a financial and economic crisis).8  This small sample suggests that
the legislature’s failure to act in the most recent Congress may be attributa-
ble as much or more to idiosyncratic, short-term factors (such as the fluctuat-
ing needs of the country (including the presence or absence of a national
crisis) or political calculations (or miscalculations)) as opposed to structural
defects in the electoral or legislative processes.  What is needed to establish
gridlock is some baseline measure of “expected” productivity of a reasonably
well-functioning Congress under the circumstances in which it is operating.
Rather than speculate on the existence of gridlock, this Essay has merely
taken the symposium’s topic seriously and tried to evaluate constructively one
proposal to reduce it.
This Essay considers nonpartisan staff employed in one particular con-
text—within a highly partisan environment such as Congress.  The discussion
6 Cf. RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 381 (2007) (warning against revi-
val of seniority system in committees); Pietro S. Nivola & William A. Galston, Toward Depo-
larization, in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION? 235, 246–51 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds.,
2008) (describing earlier efforts to suppress partisanship that had unforeseen side effects).
7 See PAUL S. RUNDQUIST ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-90 S, CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND IMPACTS 15–16 (1992); MICHAEL J.
MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 239–51 (1980); Dennis J. Tuchler, Has Congress Abdi-
cated Its Legislative Authority to Its Staff?, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2000); cf.
Linda Gordon, If the Progressives Were Advising Us Today, Should We Listen?, 1 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGRESSIVE ERA 109, 112–14 (2002) (explaining that Progressive faith in nonpartisan,
professional expertise was in tension with representative democracy).
8 See Ezra Klein, Good News: The 112th Congress’s Do-Nothing Reign Is Over, WASH. POST,
Jan. 4, 2013, at A2 (comparing productivity of 111th and 112th Congresses).  For a brief
review of the events leading to the “fiscal cliff” crisis at the end of 2012 and its resolution,
see Wesley Elmore & Lindsey McPherson, U.S. Goes Over Fiscal Cliff, but Just for a Day, 138
TAX NOTES 12 (2013).
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may not be relevant to staff working in other circumstances, such as within a
nonpartisan public policy organization.  As we shall see, the combination of
nonpartisan staff serving partisan principals raises especially challenging
questions.
I. PRINCIPAL NONPARTISAN PROFESSIONAL STAFFS IN CONGRESS,
PAST AND PRESENT
This Part briefly describes nonpartisan professional staff employed by
the congressional committees and a number of legislative support organiza-
tions.  The support organizations were created during two periods: towards
the end of the Progressive Era (1914–1926) and the early 1970s.
A. Committee Staffs
Committees officially began employing staffs in 1856 when appropria-
tions were approved for both the House Ways & Means and Senate Finance
Committees (which at the time still had jurisdiction over both appropriations
and revenues).  With the exception of the appropriations committees
(formed after the Civil War), most committees in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century had few staff, and they were almost all clerical or secretarial
aides (including many patronage appointments).  By 1913, there was a total
of only about 300 mostly nonprofessional aides in the House and Senate
spread among 135 standing committees, and the number and type of staff
remained largely unchanged for the next three decades.9  During this
period, the committees received some professional help not counted in the
official records from both executive agencies and private groups.10
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 194611 marked the formal begin-
ning of professional staff for the committees.12  One of the purposes of the
9 See CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN 255 (1963) (stating that among committee
staff “[a]t the outbreak of World War II, only the . . . Appropriations committees and the
[JCT] employed ‘well trained technically qualified staffs with continuity of tenure’” (cita-
tion omitted)); HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS 171
tbl.3 (1977) (reporting 303 total staff for House and Senate committees in 1914); GEORGE
B. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 273 (1953) (reporting 135 standing
committees in House and Senate in 1913); MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SAMUEL C. PATTERSON,
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (3d ed. 1977) (reporting that most
staff were patronage appointees at end of World War II); George B. Galloway, The Operation
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 54 (1951) (reporting
that prior to 1946 Act, there were a total of 356 staff employed by the House and Senate
committees, and few were professionals).  By contrast, congressional committees had total
staff of about 2600 in 2010. See R. ERIC PETERSEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41366,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP,
AND OTHER OFFICES, 1977–2010, at 17–18 tbl.2, 24 tbl.7 (2010).
10 See BERTRAM M. GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 280 (1953).
11 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.
12 See Roger H. Davidson, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357, 357 (1990) (claiming that the “most enduring”
aspect of 1946 legislation was authorization of professional staffing of committees); Gallo-
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Act was to give Congress its own source of professional expertise, indepen-
dent of the executive branch and private interests.13  The law authorized
each standing committee in the House and Senate (other than the appropri-
ations committees)
to appoint, by a majority vote of the committee not more than four profes-
sional staff members . . . on a permanent basis without regard to political
affiliations and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the
office; and said staff members shall be assigned to the chairman and ranking
minority member . . . as the committee may deem advisable.14
The decision to appoint staff “without regard to political affiliations” was
consistent with congressional practice at the time.  The appropriations com-
mittees had long hired on a nonpartisan basis,15 as did legislative support
organizations (described below) that had been created by Congress prior to
1946.
Subsequent to the 1946 Act, staffing practices on the congressional com-
mittees varied.  At the beginning of the 81st Congress (1949), when Demo-
crats took control of each chamber, about one-third of the professional staff
of the committees turned over, giving some indication of the politicization of
such staff at that time.  Galloway estimated in 1953 that about half of the
professional staffers appeared to be competent and well-trained, but the rest
were hired for political reasons.16  Committees generally followed two differ-
ent patterns in hiring professional staff.  Some hired staff to help with partic-
ular topics, whereas others allowed the majority and minority party members
to make separate hires (even though the 1946 Act did not contemplate this
practice).  As a practical matter, hiring by topic became an effective way to
prevent the minority members from having any staff since the topics of the
committee were largely chosen by the chair and majority members of the
committee.17  The 1946 Act gave the power to the committee to appoint staff
(and divide them between the majority and minority), which meant that the
way, supra note 9, at 54 (describing the 1946 Act’s provision of professional staff for com- R
mittees as “real innovation”).
13 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 402 (1981).
14 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 202(a), 60 Stat. at 834.  The appropriations
committees were given greater leeway to appoint staff. See id. § 202(b).
15 See EDWARD T. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 77-299, at 15–16 (1941) (describing that during the seventy-six year history of the
House Appropriations Committee from 1865–1941, there were twenty-one different chair-
men but only three persons holding the position of professional staff clerk, which reflected
the consistent policy of the committee to maintain permanent staff regardless of political
control); GLADYS M. KAMMERER, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STAFFING SINCE 1946, at 3–6
(1951); cf. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE 150 (1966) (reporting same
practice as of 1963).
16 See GALLOWAY, supra note 9, at 414; Galloway, supra note 9, at 55.  About the same R
time, Kammerer estimated that about sixty percent of Senate committees and two-thirds of
House committees had hired staff of professional competence. See Gladys M. Kammerer,
The Record of Congress in Committee Staffing, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1126, 1127–28 (1951).
17 See GROSS, supra note 10, at 282; JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 226. R
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majority party controlled both decisions.  In some committees, the decisions
were made exclusively by the committee’s chairman, with only pro forma
approval by the other majority members of the committee.18
In part to address minority party rights, the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970 increased the number of professional staff for each committee to
six, and specifically designated two staffers to be controlled by the minority
party.19  Thus, if 1946 was the formal start of the use of professional staff in
the committees, 1970 was the formal switch from a “nonpartisan” to “biparti-
san” structure.  Despite designating certain staff for the majority and minority
parties (and giving control of them to each party separately), the 1970 Act
still provided that professional staff be appointed “without regard to political
affiliation, and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of their
respective positions.”20  The number of professional staff per committee has
increased in subsequent years, but the preservation of a bipartisan structure,
with about one-third of staff reserved for the minority party, has generally
been followed.21
B. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Staff
The idea for professional staff to help Congress with their research
needs originated in the states and is generally credited to Dr. Charles McCar-
thy.  McCarthy was working in the University of Wisconsin library while pur-
suing a Ph.D. in history when a state legislator asked if the library had
“anything on railroads.”  The legislator was so overwhelmed by the mountain
of books he received in response that he left without reading any of them.
McCarthy became convinced that legislators should have at their disposal
something more responsive to their needs—a service capable of collecting
and digesting information, and providing quick and accessible material on
any subject of legislative importance.22  In 1901, McCarthy established a legis-
18 See KAMMERER, supra note 15, at 56; Kammerer, supra note 16, at 1127. R
19 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 301(a), 302(b), 84
Stat. 1140, 1175–77; see KENNETH KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS 68–69 (3d
ed. 1977) (criticizing “earmarking” of separate staff for minority); Walter Kravitz, The
Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q.
375, 379 (1990).
20 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 § 301(a), 84 Stat. at 1176.
21 See COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
1789–1994, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-324, at 164 (1994); RUNDQUIST ET AL., supra note 7, at 1–6;
JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 90-153 GOV, MINORITY STAFFING: A CHRONOLOGI-
CAL HISTORY 1 (1990) [ILL]; Kravitz, supra note 19, at 388.  There is a wide variation of R
practice among the committees, depending upon its tradition and the attitudes of its chair
and ranking member.  In some committees, majority and minority staff are selected sepa-
rately but work closely together.
22 See Congressional Reference Bureau: Hearings Before H. Comm. on the Library, 62d Cong.
44 (1912) [hereinafter Hearings Before H. Comm. on the Library] (statement of Dr. Charles
McCarthy, Chief, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Department); Rex Mitchell Baxter, The
Legislative Reference Library, 39 THE ARENA 674 (1908).
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lative reference bureau in Wisconsin that became a model for many similar
state organizations during the next decade.23
McCarthy and his bureau were committed to nonpartisanship from the
start.  One of his “essentials” for a legislative reference bureau was for it to be
“entirely nonpolitical and nonpartisan or else it will be worse than useless.  If
[there is a] choice between establishing a political department and no
department at all take the latter.”24  He emphasized this point in testimony
he offered to Congress in 1912 when it began considering creation of such a
bureau.25
The main point of contention in Congress was whether the bureau
should incorporate both a reference service and bill-drafting.  Some saw the
two tasks as going hand-in-hand, but others thought the jobs should be sepa-
rated.26  Some also believed that although all members should have access to
the reference service, only the committees and certain others needed help
with bill-drafting.27  Finally, although a nonpartisan reference service was rel-
atively uncontroversial, there was disagreement on whether a bill-drafting ser-
vice was needed,28 and whether it should be nonpartisan or serve the
members of each party separately.29  In 1914, with the Senate unable to pass
a comprehensive bill, Sen. LaFollette (R.-Wisc.) inserted an amendment into
an appropriations bill to fund creation of a legislative reference unit within
the Library of Congress, and Congress approved it.30  A substantially similar
rider funded the service every subsequent year until 1946.31
23 Between 1901 and 1913, thirty-four states established similar organizations for their
legislators. See Hearings Before H. Comm. on the Library, supra note 22, at 49 (statement of R
Rep. Townsend) (estimating the number around twenty-five); John B. Kaiser, Scientific Law-
Making, 75 THE INDEP. 641, 641 (1913).
24 HERBERT PUTNAM, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAUS, LETTER FROM THE LIBRARIAN OF
CONGRESS TRANSMITTING SPECIAL REPORT RELATIVE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAUS, S.
Doc. No. 62-7, at 7 (1911) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 See Hearings Before H. Comm. on the Library, supra note 22, at 45 (statement of Dr. R
Charles McCarthy, Chief, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Department).  Two witnesses
urged for a nonpartisan corps of assistants who would present “simply information and not
conclusions.” Id. at 70 (statement of Hon. Swagar Sherley, Member of Congress from Ken-
tucky); see also id. at 28–29 (statement of Mr. Frederick Cleveland, Chairman, President’s
Commission on Economy and Efficiency).
26 See id. at 22–26 (statement of Hon. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress) (argu-
ing for separate jobs); id. at 76–77 (statement of Mr. Middleton Beaman, of New York)
(arguing the jobs should be combined).
27 See Legislative Drafting Bureau and Legislative Reference Division of the Library of Congress:
Hearings on S. 8337 and S. 8335 Before the S. Comm. on the Library, 62d Cong. 7 (1913) (testi-
mony of Sen. LaFollette (R.-Wisc.)).
28 See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. R
29 See Hearings on S. 8337 and S. 8335 at 9–10, 22–23 (testimony of Sen. Owen (D.-
Ok.)) (proposing separate bill-drafters for members of each party).
30 See Appropriations Act of July 16, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-127, 38 Stat. 454, 463 (1914)
(appropriating funds to create legislative reference unit within Library of Congress); 51
CONG. REC. 10,467 (1914); id. at 11,207–09 (discussing approval of the Senate
amendment).
31 See GALLOWAY, supra note 9, at 407–08. R
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In 1946, the reference bureau was named the “Legislative Reference Ser-
vice,” with its duties formalized and expanded.  Up until that time, the refer-
ence bureau had hired on a nonpartisan basis, but the 1946 Act formalized
the appointment of staff by the Librarian of Congress “without reference to
political affiliations, solely on the ground of fitness to perform the duties of
their office.”32  In 1970, the service was renamed the “Congressional
Research Service” and directed to help the committees evaluate legislative
proposals “without partisan bias.”  The Librarian of Congress was instructed
to grant CRS “complete research independence and the maximum practica-
ble administrative independence consistent with [its duties].”  The rule
requiring staff to be appointed “without regard to political affiliation” was
retained.33
C. The Offices of Legislative Counsel (OLC) Staff
As noted, congressional interest in a bill-drafting service arose at the
same time a reference service was being considered.  Previously, legislative
bills were drafted by the members themselves, sometimes with the assistance
of volunteers or persons paid by the members.  In 1913, the Senate debated a
bill to create both the reference service and a “legislative drafting bureau,”
with staff for the latter to be appointed “without reference to party affilia-
tions, and solely on the ground of fitness to perform the duties of the
office.”34  In opposing the bill (which was not approved), Sen. Bacon (D.-
Ga.) stated:
I think it is the most astonishing piece of legislation I have ever heard pro-
posed in this body.  If the time has come . . . when Senators are going to
need a schoolmaster to teach them how to draft a bill, I think it is about time
that the Senators who are in such need should retire to their homes, resume
their seats on their school benches, and let somebody else come here who is
capable of doing such work.35
A decade later, at least some members of Congress continued to hold
this view.36  Indeed, to some members, the hiring of professional staff assist-
ants was an “implied slur” upon the abilities of the members receiving the
assistance.37  Bacon also seemed to belittle the notion of a nonpartisan staff
appointment, stating that if such an “all-wise man” with “great learning . . .
32 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 203(a), (b)(1), 60 Stat.
812, 836.
33 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 321(a), 84 Stat. 1140,
1181–82; see Kravitz, supra note 19, at 383, 386 (claiming that revision was intended “[t]o R
make the CRS more directly responsive to Congress . . . [and give] it complete research
[and greater administrative] independence from the Library of Congress”).
34 50 CONG. REC. 2375–76 (1913) (debating Senate Bill 1240).
35 Id. at 2376.
36 See 64 CONG. REC. 2111–12 (1923) (statement of Rep. Sisson (D.-Miss.)).
37 GROSS, supra note 10, at 282; see WILLIAM L. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES R
52 (1969).
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absolute sincerity of purpose and patriotism” could be found, Congress
should install that person as the lawmaker of the country.38
Following defeat of the bill-drafting proposal (and pursuant to a pro-
gram sponsored by Columbia University), Middleton Beaman and several
others began working as volunteer aides in Congress to help with legislative
drafting.  The trial demonstration of professional staff help soon paid off.
Rep. Kitchin (D.-N.C.), chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee
and House Majority Leader, was initially reluctant to utilize the help of “uni-
versity professors.”  He relented, however, and the talents of Beaman (and
the others) were used to draft several extremely challenging tax bills between
1916 and 1918.39  In 1918, at the strong urging of the Ways & Means Com-
mittee, Congress created a permanent legislative drafting office in each
chamber.  Under the original statute, the directors of the House and Senate
offices were appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate (i.e., the Vice President), respectively, “without reference to political
affiliations and solely on the ground of fitness to perform the duties of the
office.”40
In 1924, the drafting service became the House and Senate Offices of
Legislative Counsel, which continue to serve Congress today.41  Beaman, who
eventually served as House Legislative Counsel for thirty years, testified in
1945 that in the years since his appointment, no one had ever asked him
about his politics.42  The office was expanded in 1946 and described as hav-
ing “permanent career staff independent of politics [rendering services] of
the highest quality.”43  In 1970, Congress described the purpose of the
House OLC as “maintain[ing] impartiality as to issues of legislative policy”
and “not advocat[ing] the adoption or rejection of any legislation.”44
38 50 CONG. REC. 2377 (1913); see Frederic P. Lee, The Office of the Legislative Counsel, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 383–84 (1929).
39 See GALLOWAY, supra note 9, at 409; Lee, supra note 38, at 385–86. R
40 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 1303(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1141 (1919); see
H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 39 (1918).  Kitchin by this point had become a strong supporter.
See 56 CONG. REC. app. at 661, 701–02 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kitchin).  The appointing
officer for the director of the Senate office was changed to the president pro tempore of the
Senate in 1941. See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, § 602, 55 Stat. 687, 726.
41 See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 1101, 43 Stat. 253, 353.  The commit-
tee report described the drafting service as a “nonpolitical, non-patronage law office.” S.
REP. NO. 68-398, at 47 (1924).
42 See James P. Gleason, Legislative Counsel in Congress, 38 GEO L.J. 277, 278 (1950);
Harry W. Jones, Bill-Drafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures, 65 HARV. L. REV.
441, 446 (1952) (reporting that there was no staff turnover at the OLC when control of
either chamber changed).
43 Galloway, supra note 9, at 53.
44 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 502, 84 Stat. 1140,
1202.  The requirement to appoint staff “without regard to political affiliation” was
retained. Id. §§ 521, 522, 84 Stat. at 1202–03.
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D. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) Staff
From the nation’s earliest days, Congress has struggled with controlling
the use of federal funds by the executive branch.  Congress has sometimes
written detailed appropriations bills, but agencies have complained about the
lack of flexibility and also been able to circumvent the limitations.  Congress
has also created internal checks, such as requiring multiple approvals of
spending, but the system has sometimes become riddled with confusion and
delays.45
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Progressive movement and the
financial stresses of World War I heightened congressional interest in
improving economy and efficiency in federal spending.46  In 1919, Congress
began considering legislative proposals to establish a budget office within the
executive branch and an office of the comptroller general that would report
to Congress on federal spending and be independent of the executive
branch.  A principal issue was determining the power of appointment and
removal of the comptroller general.  This issue raised both a separation-of-
powers question and a policy concern of how to insulate the position from
politics.47
In 1921, Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act establishing an
annual budget process and creating both the Bureau of the Budget (now the
Office of Management and Budget) within the executive branch and the
General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) as
an establishment independent of the executive branch.48  The comptroller
general, who would head the new GAO, was to be appointed by the President
(with advice and consent of the Senate) for a nonrenewable fifteen-year
term, and could be removed by joint resolution of Congress only for reasons
specified in the statute.49  The purpose of the GAO was to investigate the use
of public funds and recommend changes to provide greater economy and
efficiency.50
Although congressional debate reflects an interest in the comptroller
general being nonpartisan, there is no specific limitation imposed by the stat-
ute (other than the general restrictions on the appointment and removal
45 See RICHARD E. BROWN, THE GAO 10 (1970).
46 See ROGER R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16–19 (1996).
47 See id. at 23–35; National Budget System: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on the Budget of
the H.R., 66th Cong. 438–40 (1919) (testimony of Francis Oakey, Consulting Accountant,
Bureau of Efficiency); National Budget: Hearings on H.R. 9783 Before the S. Comm. On Consid-
eration of a National Budget, 66th Cong. 74 (1920) (testimony of Nicholas Murray Butler,
President, Columbia University).
48 Budget & Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20.
49 See id. §§ 201, 207, 301–03, 42 Stat. at 20–24.  A joint congressional resolution
required the President’s signature to take effect.  An earlier version of the legislation was
vetoed by President Wilson at the very end of his term because it provided for removal by
concurrent resolution of each House of Congress, which would not have required the Pres-
ident’s signature to be effective. See TRASK, supra note 46, at 35–38. R
50 See Budget & Accounting Act of 1921 § 312(a).
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process and the fixed, fifteen-year term).51  There was apparently a general
expectation that the appointment would be political, but that once in office,
the appointee would act in an apolitical manner.52  Over the years, the
lengthy term of office has helped to preserve the independence of the comp-
troller general and the GAO.53  In its first sixty years, there were only five
comptrollers general and over half of the Presidents did not have an oppor-
tunity to make even a single appointment.  By contrast, over the same period,
there were twenty-five directors of the executive branch’s budget office, with
change of control of that branch regularly resulting in an appointment of a
new director.54
E. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) Staff
The JCT is a bipartisan committee of ten members of the House and
Senate tax-writing committees.  The committee has no legislative jurisdiction
and rarely convenes hearings or performs other traditional functions of a
legislative committee; its principal purpose is to provide justification for hav-
ing a staff.55  The JCT and its staff were created in 1926 following a bitter,
public feud between Sen. Couzens (R.-Mi.) and Andrew Mellon (who was in
the midst of an eleven-year tenure as Secretary of the Treasury under three
Republican Administrations).56  The feud and its aftermath antagonized
Congress’s relationship with the executive branch, but improved cooperation
between the House and Senate, and both were instrumental in the JCT’s
creation.  Congress saw the need to have staff that could examine tax returns,
investigate the tax agency’s practices and administration of the law, monitor
51 A proposed amendment to reduce the term to seven years was criticized because it
“would throw the office into politics rather than to take it out of politics.”  61 CONG. REC.
1080 (1921) (statement of Rep. Knutson (R.-Minn.)).
52 See 61 CONG. REC. 1090 (1921) (statement of Rep. Good (R.-Iowa)) (“It was the
intention of the committee that the comptroller general should be . . . a real critic, and at
all times should come to Congress, no matter what the political complexion of Congress or
the Executive might be, and point out inefficiency . . . .”).  The first comptroller general
was John McCarl whose appointment, according to Trask, was “largely political.” TRASK,
supra note 46, at 50.  McCarl, however, developed a reputation of resisting political pres- R
sure and scrutinizing the propriety of even the smallest expenditures.  He helped establish
a reputation of independence and integrity for the agency. See id. at 49–65.
53 See id. at 529–30.
54 See FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 4–5 (1984).
55 See I.R.C. §§ 8002(a), 8004 (2006); CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH,
COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 14–15 (3d ed. 1997); Walter J. Oleszek, House-Senate Relationships:
Comity and Conflict, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75, 81 (1974) (stating that the
JCT “functions mainly as a holding company for staff”).  Most of the information in this
section is derived from George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in
the History of the World,” and Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2151409. See Overview,
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2013).
56 See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127–28.
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the agency’s enforcement activities, and help the tax-writing committees with
the formation of tax legislation.
The principal duty of the staff—currently including about forty econo-
mists, lawyers, and accountants—is to serve as a policy advisor to the chairs,
ranking members, and other members of the tax-writing committees.  In this
role, the staff helps to conceive, analyze, and evaluate many tax policy
options for those committees and assists with all of the legislative tasks neces-
sary for enactment of a proposal.  The staff also provides the official revenue
estimates used by Congress for all proposed tax legislation,57 reviews all large
tax refunds made by the IRS,58 and monitors the agency’s administration of
the tax laws.  Occasionally, the staff performs tax-related investigations, such
as examining President Nixon’s tax returns and the tax positions of the
Enron Corp.59
From the beginning, the JCT staff has been nonpartisan, although the
legislative background does not clearly explain the reason.60  The Senator
who conceived of the staff spoke of the need for “an independent body,
something selected wholly separate from any influence” possibly because one
role he saw for the staff was to examine confidential (and politically sensitive)
tax return information.61  The need for the staff had grown out of a dispute
in which Congress thought the executive branch had committed various
abuses, including using tax return information for political purposes.
Another possible explanation was cost-savings; as we have seen, professional
staff assistance for the committees was quite unusual in 1926, and nonparti-
san (and joint) staff may have been more acceptable because it could avoid
duplication of effort.62  Also, to the extent Congress used professional staff, it
was clearly the norm in 1926 to hire on a nonpartisan basis.  There is no rule,
however, specifying how staff are to be selected.  At present, the selection of
the Chief of Staff alternates between the House and Senate tax-writing com-
57 See 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2006).
58 See I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2006).
59 See id. § 8022(1).
60 See Letter from Laurence N. Woodworth, Chief of Staff, JCT, to Spiros J. Caramalis
(Mar. 12, 1965) (on file in Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Wash., D.C.), RG 128, Ch. 23,
Records of J. Comm. on Int. Rev. Tax’n (1926-75) (box #202) (“JCIRT 1965” file)) (report-
ing that since formation of the JCT staff in 1926, it had been nonpartisan with only three
Chiefs of Staff, each of whom served under both Republican and Democratic regimes);
Letter from Colin F. Stam, Chief of Staff, JCT, to Max M. Kampelman, Legis. Counsel to
Sen. Hubert Humphrey (Aug. 6, 1953) (on file in Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.
(Wash., D.C.), RG 128, Ch. 23 Records of J. Comm. on Int. Rev. Tax’n (1926075) (box
#185) (“JCIRT work” file)) (reporting that when Republicans took control of both cham-
bers in 1953, there was no turnover among the JCT staff “except where members volunta-
rily resigned to accept positions offering greater remuneration”).
61 Revenue Act of 1926: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 69th Cong. 216
(1926) (statement of Sen. Jones (D.-N.M.)).
62 Cf. 1 HAYNES, supra note 2, at 315 (claiming that “service of joint committees . . . R
might avoid enormous waste of time and duplication of effort”); MORROW, supra note 37, at R
37–38, 215–17; THOMAS J. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 64 (1980) (questioning
whether Congress would pay for two staffs the size and quality of the JCT staff).
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mittee chairs (with at least acquiescence by the other chair),63 and the chief
then selects all other staff with pro forma approval by the JCT.64  Of all of the
legislative support organizations, the duties of the JCT staff most closely par-
allel those of committee staffs.  Unlike most committee staffs, however, the
JCT staff is not affiliated with any party and is not separated into majority and
minority party staff members.65
F. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Staff
The OTA was created in 1972 “to provide early indications of the proba-
ble beneficial and adverse impacts” of new technological developments.66
The office was largely the brainchild of Rep. Emilio Daddario (D.-Ct.), who
chaired the House Technology subcommittee during the period of the
office’s conception.  From the beginning, the exact mission of the office was
somewhat vague, and it soon provided policy analysis on a range of issues,
including health care, energy policy, environmental issues, land and resource
management, international trade, and defense.67
The statute authorizing the OTA created a three-part organizational
structure.  First, it established a thirteen-member “Technology Assessment
Board,” consisting of twelve members of Congress (six each from the House
and Senate, divided equally by party) and the director of the office (who had
no vote).  House members were appointed by the Speaker, and Senators
were appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate.  The Board set the
policy for the office, appointed its director (to a six-year term), and became
involved to some extent in policy implementation.  The Board, for example,
approved each study of the office before it began, and sometimes reworded
conclusions of reports to soften language found to be too pointed.  The
Board also retained veto power over staff selected by the director and, more
importantly, could instruct the director to appoint certain staff (a procedure
known as “Rule 12”).  Board members could also request that certain studies
be performed.68
Second, the statute authorized a twelve-member “Technology Assess-
ment Advisory Council,” consisting of ten public experts, the comptroller
63 See REESE, supra note 62, at 63 (1980) (reporting that “[t]he chief of staff has always R
been someone who is acceptable to both chairmen”).
64 See KAMMERER, supra note 15, at 40–41. R
65 One observer has suggested that the highly technical nature of tax legislation tends
to demand restrained partisanship (among other things). See JOHN F. MANLEY, THE POLIT-
ICS OF FINANCE 64, 71 (1970).  During roughly the last four decades, however, both the
Ways & Means and Finance Committees have employed partisan staff who have worked
alongside the nonpartisan JCT staff on tax legislation.
66 Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-484, § 3(c), 86 Stat. 797, 797.
67 See BRUCE BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS 8, 26 (1996); DONALD
LAMBRO, FAT CITY 248 (1980).
68 See Technology Assessment Act of 1972 §§ 3(b), (d)(2), 4(a), (d), 5(a), 86 Stat. at
797–99; BIMBER, supra note 67, at 29–30, 53.  Committee chairs could also request studies, R
and about one-fourth were performed for chairs who were also board members. See id. at
33.
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general of the GAO, and the director of CRS.  The Council advised the
Board on the selection of projects and helped evaluate the office’s reports.
Both the CRS and GAO were also required to provide various supplemental
services to the OTA.69
Finally, the work of the office was performed by a director and staff.  The
first director was Daddario, who, by the time the office was formed, had left
Congress and lost a campaign to be governor of Connecticut.  Other than his
service as subcommittee chair, Daddario (who was a lawyer, war veteran, and
elected public official beginning at the age of twenty-eight) does not appear
to have had any particular background in science or technology prior to
becoming OTA director.70
Except for one reference in the OTA statute to Congress’s need for
“competent, unbiased information,”71 there is no indication that the office
and its staff were organized to be nonpartisan.72  Indeed, the structure and
initial steps taken to form the office—including the selection of Daddario as
director, the placement by individual Board members of their “own” staff on
the OTA staff pursuant to Rule 12, the Board’s involvement in the actual
operations of the office, and the domination over the office by Sen. Kennedy
(D.-Mass.) (who was the first Board chairman)—led to the exact opposite
conclusion.73  By the end of its first half-dozen years, the OTA was “highly
politicized” and “appeared to be an utter failure at providing neutral exper-
tise.”74  The OTA staff’s experience in trying to become less politicized and
more influential is instructive, as discussed in Part II.
G. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Staff
The final example of nonpartisan professional staff is that of the CBO,
formed in 1974.  The CBO may presently be the best known of the legislative
support organizations because of the pervasive importance of budget issues
in evaluating policy options.  The office publishes each year a ten-year and
long-term analysis of the country’s budgetary situation, and an analysis of the
President’s budget proposal.  In addition, the CBO periodically publishes
analyses of the budget and economic effects of various major policy propos-
69 See Technology Assessment Act of 1972 §§ 7(a), (b), 8, 9, 86 Stat. at 800–02.
70 See Daddario, Emilio Quincy, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bio
guide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000001 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); 156
CONG. REC. S6859 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd (D.-Ct.)) (“Remember-
ing Congressman Emilio Daddario”).
71 Technology Assessment Act of 1972 § 2(d)(1), 86 Stat. at 797.
72 One of the original public supporters of the OTA commented that the office was
intended to provide nonpartisan, neutral competence. See BIMBER, supra note 67, at 50 R
(quoting Harvey Brooks).
73 Sen. Kennedy indicated that he saw no conflict in staff being responsible to both a
Board member and the OTA.  Sen. Humphrey (D.-Minn.) (another Board member) stated
that he would allow a staff person to be responsible to Daddario, but only with the under-
standing that the person would be available to Humphrey whenever needed. See id. at 54.
74 Id. at 51; see id. at 20; LAMBRO, supra note 67, at 248. R
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als, testifies regularly on those issues, supports the annual congressional
budget process, and provides cost estimates of all spending proposals.75
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974,76 which created the CBO, was
enacted to centralize Congress’s control over the budget and to improve the
legislature’s budget resources.  Ever since the 1921 Act establishing the exec-
utive branch’s annual budget process and creating the Bureau of the Budget,
that branch had been viewed as having the upper hand on budget matters.
The 1974 Act also arose because of specific conflicts Congress had with the
executive branch, including frustration with the Johnson Administration’s
budgeting for the Vietnam War and Great Society programs (including Medi-
care and Medicaid) during the late 1960’s, and the Nixon Administration’s
impoundment of funds and insistence on congressional spending ceilings
during the early 1970s.  Finally, Congress approved the Act in the hope that it
would help avoid the frequent and unpopular task of raising the debt ceiling.
In addition to the CBO, the law created the House and Senate Budget Com-
mittees and an annual congressional budget process.77
Under the law, the CBO director is appointed “without regard to politi-
cal affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties”
jointly by the Speaker of the House and president pro tempore of the Senate
after considering recommendations from the two Budget Committees.78  By
custom, the two Budget Committees alternate making a recommendation,
and their selection has been accepted by the appointing officers.79  The
director’s term is four years, and begins on January third of the year preced-
ing a presidential election (i.e., roughly the middle of the term of a sitting
President).  Thus, the director’s appointment is insulated somewhat from
presidential politics but still occurs immediately after a congressional elec-
tion (and a possible change of control of either chamber).  The director may
be removed by resolution of either chamber.  The director appoints the rest
of the staff, again “without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of their fitness to perform their duties.”80
H. Summary
The following table summarizes the appointment process of the head of
each of the staffs described.  It sets out who appoints the staff chief, any non-
partisan condition of appointment, the term of appointment (if any), and
the conditions for removal of the staff chief.  For most committees after 1970,
75 See Our Products, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/our-
products (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
76 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
77 See id. §§ 101–311, 88 Stat. at 299–316; PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE 15–16 (2011).
78 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 201(a)(2), 88 Stat. at 302.
79 See ROBERT KEITH & MARY FRANCES BLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31880, CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR
2 (2005).
80 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 201(b), 88 Stat. at 302.
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there is a separate chief of the majority and minority staff who is appointed
by the majority and minority members, respectively, of the committee.
II. NONPARTISAN PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND GRIDLOCK
A. A Theoretical Case for Nonpartisan Staff
Aside from claiming that it would lessen the influence of the parties in
the legislature, Edwards does not clearly explain how nonpartisan staff would
help to reduce gridlock.  This Section outlines a theoretical case for why such
staff might accomplish that end.  The argument is applicable whether
gridlock is primarily caused by the parties or by two related factors—an
excessive focus in Congress on campaigning and reelection (as opposed to
governing),81 or extreme ideological polarization.82
Staff serve in Congress without being elected to it, and can continue to
serve without being reelected.  Thus, to the extent there are party or ideolog-
ical filters that restrict the type of person who can be elected to serve, staff
may avoid them.  Further, to the extent reelection worries activate the same
filters to restrict how members can behave once in Congress, or simply
reduce the amount of time that can be spent governing effectively, staff may
avoid these restraints as well.  In short, at least in theory, staff can work in
Congress with one principal objective—to help develop workable legislative
solutions to the nation’s problems.
Staff functions in Congress vary considerably, but in general, staff per-
form virtually all of the legislative tasks (short of voting) necessary for enact-
ment of a bill.  At a minimum, professional staff assimilate, condense, and
synthesize information for members of Congress.  Staff may obtain this infor-
mation from sources external to Congress (by, for example, organizing and
briefing members on hearings, reviewing and summarizing hearing testi-
mony and other written submissions, meeting with constituents, interest
81 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE 2–5 (2012)
(attributing inability to reach compromises to focus of legislators on campaigning and
reelection).
82 See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER 5–6 (2010) (attributing gridlock
to increased polarization and anti-majoritarian aspects of political system); SARAH A.
BINDER, STALEMATE 68, 79–81 (2003) (claiming increased polarization of parties encour-
ages deadlock); BROWNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 11 (blaming partisanship and extreme polari- R
zation); SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 355–61 (showing increased partisan polarization R
reduced the rate of successful legislative outcomes); David W. Brady et al., Polarization and
Public Policy: A General Assessment, in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION?, supra note 6, at 185, 195–205 R
(showing that polarization increases gridlock on issues of strong ideological differences);
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276–81, 329–33 (2011) (attributing legislative gridlock and
paralysis to radically polarized politics that were unleashed by the Voting Rights Act of
1965). But cf. Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and
Legislates, in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION?, supra note 6, at 55, 79 (noting that George W. Bush R
presidency was not characterized by legislative gridlock); Klein, supra note 8 (indicating R
that the 111th Congress (2009–2010) was quite productive).
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groups and executive branch representatives, and performing research), or
internal to it (by obtaining intelligence from congressional offices, commit-
tees, caucuses and other ad hoc organizations in Congress, leadership, and
the other chamber).
Some staff, however, carry out much more significant duties.  They may
interrogate witnesses at hearings (and not just organize and prepare their
members for them), prepare or solicit policy analyses (and not just assimilate
and summarize work already performed by others), organize support and
build coalitions among interest groups and the executive branch in favor of
legislative initiatives (and not just convey concerns of those groups to mem-
bers of Congress), and ultimately, conceive, negotiate, and help implement
legislative solutions in Congress (and not just advise their members about
such possibilities).  Some staff may also influence how their members vote.
Some observers have suggested that there should be “term limits for staff”
because of how influential some staff are in the legislative process.83
How exactly might nonpartisan staff improve the prospects for reaching
legislative outcomes?  Supporters of nonpartisans in the past have been some-
what vague about their benefits, referring generally to persons who would be
“objective,” “independent,” and not subject to political influence.84  In con-
trast, Brownstein has characterized partisans as offering only “either-or alter-
natives” as opposed to “solutions built on the principle of both-and.”85  To
him, partisan solutions are like “trying to cut a piece of paper by using only
one blade of a scissors.”86  From these nebulous descriptions, we might
83 Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Career Dynamics of Congressional Legislative
Staff: Preliminary Profile and Research Questions, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 415, 419,
426–27, 429 (1996); see RUNDQUIST ET AL., supra note 7, at 10–19 (describing staff functions R
and impact); ROCHELLE JONES & PETER WOLL, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF CONGRESS 154–65
(1979) (describing critical role of Senate staff); MALBIN, supra note 7, at 5 (describing R
important staff activities); Christine DeGregorio & Kevin Snider, Leadership Appeal in the
U.S. House of Representatives: Comparing Officeholders and Aides, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 491, 498
(1995) (reporting survey showing slightly more than one-third of people selected as
“House leaders” (people who, through their positions, forcefulness of ideas, and tactical
prowess, play a central role in lawmaking) are staff, especially committee staff); Susan
Webb Hammond, Recent Research on Legislative Staffs, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 543, 544–52 (1996)
(reviewing literature on staff activities and influence and concluding that “staff are major
actors and important participants (and leaders) in the policy process”).
84 See DAVID E. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE LAWS? 196 (1972) (describing nonpartisanship
as “neutral competence—performance according to explicit, objective standards rather
than . . . personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Galloway, supra note 9, at 56 (describing nonpartisan com- R
mittee staff authorized by the 1946 Act as providing Congress with an “unbiased,
competent source of expert information and analysis”); John F. Manley, Congressional Staff
and Public Policy-Making: The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30 J. POL. 1046,
1050–52 (1968) (describing role of nonpartisan JCT staff as professional, independent,
highly reliable, objective, and neutral).
85 BROWNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 10. R
86 Id. at 389.  Brownstein offers a number of examples of how principles of inclusion
and concession might help to resolve some of the nation’s problems. See id. at 388–99; see
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hypothesize nonpartisan staff as offering several potential advantages over
partisans.  At a minimum, they may collect and provide to members of Con-
gress information that is more complete and balanced than what a partisan
would provide.  Some studies have suggested exactly this result.87  This differ-
ence might be important if one of the reasons for gridlock is the failure of
members to understand the multiple sides and aspects of complex issues.
Moreover, nonpartisan staff may be able to analyze options differently than
partisans, in a manner that might be persuasive to members of Congress with
differing viewpoints.  Their analysis may reveal more clearly to a range of
members the relative merits of pursuing various courses of action.  Finally,
nonpartisan staff playing a more significant role in the legislative process may
be able to conceive, develop, and negotiate legislative solutions that simply
elude partisans (or partisan staff) because of their strong pre-commitments
to particular outcomes.88  Nonpartisan staff may also help to reduce the
“echo chamber” effect when like-minded persons share and reinforce their
pre-existing views, and push one another to more extreme positions that ulti-
mately become irreconcilable with the views of non-like-minded persons.89
As Barbara Sinclair has explained: “[the lives of House Members] now take
also LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1914, at 41 (2001) (describ-
ing Progressive era view of politics “as an unsavory, inherently corrupt enterprise that
rarely produced good results for society”); John A. Lapp, Non-Partisan Government, 9 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 313, 314–15 (1915) (distinguishing a nonpartisan, who can be expected to
provide “greater efficiency,” from blind partisan, who “insists upon ignorant, unyielding
and unswerving party fealty”).
87 See MALBIN, supra note 7, at 141–45 (providing case study of distorted report pre- R
pared by partisan staff and concluding that it was “a piece of propaganda, pure and sim-
ple”); id. at 149–65 (describing other questionable practices of partisan staff); id at 186
(reporting that nonpartisan staff helped Congress understand complex material and pro-
vided information that “has not been distorted to meet the chairman’s or anyone else’s
political needs”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Exam-
ple, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2345, 2356–66 (1996) (contrasting less informative and accurate report
by partisans with that prepared by nonpartisans); Michael J. Malbin, Congressional Committee
Staffs: Who’s in Charge Here?, 47 PUB. INT. 16, 29–31 (1977) (reporting how partisan staff
“repeatedly reported only that part of the story that best fit its preconceptions”); id. at 35
(explaining danger of partisan staff “shut[ting] off some ideas that would flow to a less
partisan staff”); cf. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS 62–67 (2012) (reporting misinformation circulated by partisan media).
88 During the Progressive Era, there was faith in nonpartisan experts being able to
resolve seemingly intractable stalemates. See ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK,
PROGRESSIVISM 61 (1983) (describing belief in “impartial experts . . . empowered to gather
the facts, analyze them according to the methods of science or social science, and render
rational decisions on the basis of their knowledge”); Gordon, supra note 7, at 111 (the R
“common denominator” among Progressives was that “expertise could resolve seemingly
unresolvable political stalemates”).
89 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES 159 (2009); see id. at 2, 8.  Sunstein, however,
also reports on “biased assimilation,” in which mixed groups (such as partisans of different
stripes) sometimes produce more polarization. Id. at 50.  Each side essentially discounts
information that is contrary to preexisting views and inflates the significance of supporting
evidence. See id. at 50, 52–53.
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place mostly within their party.  All this amplifies both intraparty cohesion
and interparty polarization even beyond what constituency-based ideological
homogeneity would dictate.”90
In summary, a theoretical case for nonpartisan staff reducing gridlock is
generally premised on persons having (1) particular expertise to gather and
analyze information, and be persuasive to members of Congress with differ-
ing viewpoints, in a manner different from partisans, and (2) sufficient influ-
ence in Congress to be able to effect legislative outcomes (despite not having
a vote).  The remaining Sections in this Part raise questions about this theo-
retical case.
B. Who Are Nonpartisan Staff, and How Are They Selected and Retained?
A threshold question is determining exactly what is meant by “nonparti-
san” staff.  As described in Part I and shown in Table 1, to the extent “non-
partisan” has been defined among the staffs discussed, it seems to refer to
staff hired “without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of
fitness to perform the duties of the office.”91  Thus, only one characteristic—
“political affiliation”—is specifically identified as an unacceptable employ-
ment attribute.  Moreover, even if faithfully followed, the test does not actu-
ally exclude persons by reason of their political affiliation.  The test is
commonly implemented by simply not asking applicants about their political
affiliation, and preventing them from providing that information volunta-
rily.92  Sometimes, the test is implemented by also excluding applicants who
have previously engaged in political activities.93  Thus, as commonly applied,
the test is an early version of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” with the possible addition
of “don’t have any history of acting out.”  If the theoretical case is premised
in part on staff not, in fact, having any specific political affiliation, the cur-
rent tests do not achieve that goal.
Furthermore, the test is silent on other possibly unacceptable employ-
ment attributes.  Specifically, ideology is not referenced as a disqualifying
attribute for any of the staffs.94  Yet persons with a strong ideological bent—
90 Sinclair, supra note 82, at 70. R
91 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 202(a), 60 Stat. 812,
834; see also Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 1303(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1141 (1919);
50 CONG. REC. 2375–76 (1913) (debating Senate Bill 1240);
92 See Kammerer, supra note 16, at 1128; David E. Price, Professionals and “Entrepre- R
neurs”: Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. POL. 316, 328
(1971) (describing JCT practice).
93 See Lee, supra note 38, at 398 (describing test used by legislative drafting service). R
94 Cf. PRICE, supra note 84, at 194 (JCT staff chief’s promise to remove politics from R
the staff in reality “often left him free to implement his and his mentors’ decidedly con-
servative preferences”); Kammerer, supra note 16, at 1129 (explaining that lack of turnover R
of staff when Democrats gained control of Congress in 1949 reflected fact that incoming
Democratic chairmen had policy views similar to their Republican predecessors); Manley,
supra note 84, at 1052–55 (discussing the conservative views of former Chief of Staff of the R
Joint Committee on Taxation, Colin F. Stam, which frustrated Democratic Senators due to
his influence over tax policy).
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even if not tied to any particular party—may well lack the openness to ideas
and objectivity that would contribute to the distinctive expertise necessary for
the theoretical case.  In 1951, Gladys Kammerer warned that this concern
may be especially pertinent to highly trained professionals:
Any expectation that so-called “experts[,”] even the most competent persons
available, will be above possession of an ideological slant in the field of their
expertise is naive, to say the least.  As a matter of fact, it is not too hard to
believe that the better informed and more highly trained one may be in a
special field of study, the more likely is he to have arrived at a philosophy or
at least a set of standards for action in his field.  The less likely, therefore, is
he to be able to work passively and happily on legislation which runs counter
to his philosophy.95
Aside from views arising from education and training, personal biases and
institutional influences (described in the next Section) may also affect a staff
member’s openness and objectivity.
Conceivably, the “solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of
the office”96 portion of the test might be interpreted as precluding the hiring
of strong ideologues, or a staff who all subscribe to one particular ideology,
but such an interpretation seems pretty heroic and unlikely.  Of course, any
test based on ideology, and any more stringent test involving political affilia-
tion, would raise further questions of how the disqualifying attribute would
be determined.  The general point is that if the hoped-for distinctive exper-
tise of nonpartisan staff conceives of persons with greater receptivity towards
different party or ideological positions, or at least assumes a collection of
persons with diversity of such viewpoints, the current-law tests do not necessa-
rily ensure that result.97
Obviously, a further issue is the faithful execution of any test.  Table 1
shows the range of persons responsible for making the appointment of the
staff chief of the various offices (who generally has authority to hire all other
staff members).  The one common feature of those appointing the chief is
that they are all directly or indirectly partisans.98  The experience with com-
mittee staffs in 1946, where a directive to hire staff “without regard to politi-
95 KAMMERER, supra note 15, at 57; see Malbin, supra note 87, at 25 (“[I]t is impossible R
to be both expert and neutral on all questions of policy.”).
96 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 § 202(a), 60 Stat. at 834; see supra note 91.
97 Cf. KAMMERER, supra note 15, at 34 (indicating that Senate Finance Committee R
found a tax specialist with a “sympathetic political philosophy”); Malbin, supra note 87, at R
22 (describing dissatisfaction with former JCT Chief of Staff who was viewed as politically,
but not ideologically, impartial); David Whiteman, The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional
Decision Making: Three Types of Use in Committees, 38 W. POL. Q. 294, 299–304 (1985)
(describing problems when staff begin with particular policy positions).  In 2012, a Repub-
lican Congressman accused a member of the CBO staff of being a liberal partisan based on
the staff person’s entries on his Facebook page and public records of his political contribu-
tions. See Erica Martinson, John Shimkus Blasts CBO Economist over Facebook Page, POLITICO
(May 17, 2012, 7:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76467.html.
98 The director of the CRS is appointed by the Librarian of Congress who may be
nonpartisan but is appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.
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cal affiliation” resulted in perhaps one-third to one-half of staff being hired
for political reasons, shows the potential difficulty of ensuring that any test is
properly applied.  In one instance, Congress changed the law to prevent this
type of behavior.  The Senate removed the authority of the Vice-President to
appoint staff for the Senate Legislative Counsel’s office (and transferred the
authority to the president pro tempore of the Senate) when the Vice-President
was viewed as trying to make a political appointment to that office.99  That
case, however, was probably seen by Congress as an intrusion into its preroga-
tives by the executive branch.  Congress would likely have a much more diffi-
cult time policing the hiring practices of one of its own members, as the 1946
experience suggests.  As Kammerer has written, “[i]n a body so highly politi-
cal as is the Congress, it might be too much to expect persons whose thinking
has been attuned almost entirely for years to manipulation for party or per-
sonal advantage to discard such considerations easily or quickly.”100
In some cases, the test of hiring “without regard to political affiliation”
may not even be intended to be taken seriously.  As noted, the 1970 Act
retained that test for committee staff even though one of the main purposes
of the Act was to permit separate hiring of staff by the majority and minority
parties.  Since 1970, despite the rule contained in the Act, the norm seems to
be partisan hiring by the committees, with the majority and minority mem-
bers each hiring their “own” staff.101  There is also ample evidence of parti-
san hiring on individual member staffs.  In one instance, when a Senator
changed party affiliation, many of his staff members resigned to prevent hurt-
ing their chances of future employment with offices of the original party
affiliation.102
The combination of a lengthy term of office and stringent conditions for
removal of the staff person (such as those applicable to the comptroller gen-
eral of the GAO) provides an alternative way to insulate a staffer from parti-
san influence.  But that method seems infeasible for committee staffs.  Unlike
the comptroller general, committee staff chiefs typically have close working
99 See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, § 602, 55 Stat. 687, 726; Jones, supra
note 42, at 444 n.10. R
100 KAMMERER, supra note 15, at 60; see CONG. QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUAR- R
TERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 586 (4th ed. 1991) (describing the internal pressures that
political parties and congressional leadership can apply to individual members); MORROW,
supra note 37, at 53–56 (reporting in 1969 that professional staffing on committees “is a R
highly partisan matter”).
101 See EVANS & OLESZEK, supra note 4, at 134–35 (describing heightened partisanship R
in committees after 1994); MALBIN, supra note 7, at 12–14; SUNDQUIST, supra note 13, at R
405 (indicating that by mid-1970’s, “the concept in the [1946 Act] that professional staff
members should be politically neutral . . . had long since been discarded by most commit-
tees as unworkable”); Malbin, supra note 87, at 20 (reporting that most committee staffs R
“are partisan de jure as well as de facto”).
102 See Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff: Political
Professionals or Clerks?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1251, 1267–68 (1997) (describing experience
when Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (Colo.) switched from Democrat to Republican in
1995).
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relationships with the members of their committee, including especially the
chairman of the committee.  Any fixed, lengthy term for the staff chief would
undoubtedly result in some uncongenial pairings that would, at a minimum,
undermine the influence and effectiveness of the staff person (and, there-
fore, tend to blunt the theoretical case).103  For the same reason, it is proba-
bly unrealistic to expect nonpartisan committee staff to be as independent of
partisan influence as staff of a legislative support organization.104
C. Staff Incentives
This Section assumes that people without strong pre-commitments to
political party or specific ideology can be properly identified, hired, and
retained as staff.  Would that be enough to ensure the “distinctive expertise”
assumed by the theoretical case?  The answer to that question depends
importantly on staff incentives once they begin working in Congress.105
Some staff incentives may relate primarily to career opportunities during
or after congressional service, including (1) maintaining the staff member’s
existing position, (2) getting promoted within the current office or staff, (3)
obtaining a new position with a more influential or prestigious office in Con-
gress, (4) obtaining a position in the executive branch, (5) working in the
private sector doing legislative- or non-legislative-related work, and (6) run-
ning for political office.106  Since, in general, both Congress and the execu-
tive branch are run by partisans, most of these career goals might entice a
staff member to assume partisan (and/or ideological) positions (even if they
103 Cf. Kammerer, supra note 16, at 1129 (questioning whether uncongenial pairing R
would be consistent with representative democracy).  A variation is to have a partisan staff
chief but with nonpartisan staff serving under that person, such as in executive agencies.
See id. at 1130–31 (describing short-term trend on some committees to have both a parti-
san “clerk” and nonpartisan, professional “staff director”); Malbin, supra note 87, at 38–40 R
(arguing for “dual staffing” with “a core of nonpartisan professionals . . . supplemented by
partisan” positions).
104 See MALBIN, supra note 7, at 194 (“‘Let’s not kid ourselves.  Staffs work for chairmen R
and chairmen have their own policies and ideologies.  You are nonpartisan in the sense
that you will work for any chairman who comes along, but you have got to work with the
chairman you have.’” (quoting Walter Kravitz, a former staff director of the Budget
Committee)).
105 Cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 51 (1989) (explaining that rewards and penalties influence person’s behavior
more than attitudes).
106 See RUNDQUIST ET AL., supra note 7, at 7–10 (describing staff characteristics and work R
environment); Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Recruitment and Career Patterns of
Congressional Committee Staffs: An Exploration, 39 W. POL. Q. 701, 706 (1986) (providing data
showing that staff activists on policy committees tend to “‘burn out’ quickly” and “use their
Hill experience to gain other positions both in and out of government”); Paul S. Herrn-
son, Congress’s Other Farm Team: Congressional Staff, 27 POLITY 137, 138 (1994) (describing
staff position as training ground for elective position); Romzek & Utter, supra note 83, at R
423–27 (describing career dynamics of staff).  These career opportunities may be more
pertinent to committee staffs than the legislative support organizations, which may employ
many staff who devote their entire professional careers to service for that organization.
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didn’t exist prior to congressional service) in order to gain notice and favor
from the appropriate current (or future) principal or patron.107  The typical
staff profile and working conditions may contribute to this consequence; in
general, staff are young, ambitious people working in demanding, high turn-
over jobs with short career ladders, so there may be a strong interest in
obtaining favorable notice and opportunity quickly.  As Malbin has
explained: “[g]iven their need to protect themselves against the uncertainties
of their jobs, staff members would have to be inhuman not to be affected [by
the DC-related career opportunities constantly before them].”108
To be sure, not every staff career goal leads inevitably to that result.  For
example, a staff member who simply wants to return to practicing law (not
involving legislative work) following congressional service may not feel any
particular political or ideological tug while working in Congress.  Indeed, a
reputation for performing nonpartisan, non-ideological work may actually
enhance that type of future job opportunity.  But these cases may be rela-
tively few in number.  People who self-select into working on Capitol Hill may
especially value the special opportunities opened up by that particular expe-
rience.  Also, while helping to develop certain skills (such as networking),
Hill experience sometimes allows other skills (such as the ability “simply to
practice law”) to go stale.  Thus, even staff members who desire to return
after their service to a position unrelated to Congress may find that their
opportunities to do so have been diminished.  The larger point is that staff
behavior while in Congress—and whether their work will likely further the
theoretical case—is shaped to some extent by the institution in which they
work and the incentives they face.
Some staff, although cognizant of career issues, may be motivated prima-
rily by the nature of the job on Capitol Hill including, specifically, the oppor-
tunity to work in the vortex of the nation’s law-making.  As Romzek and Utter
have stated, the “fundamental motivation of congressional staffers is to be
part of a process that affords opportunities to influence public policy.”109  As
previously noted, staff with this primary motivation may include those who
begin their congressional service with a commitment to particular policy out-
107 Interest groups and public policy “think tanks” may also be increasingly aligned with
one party or the other. See SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 308–09, 326–27.  Thus, staff who R
desire to perform legislative-related work in the private sector after their Congressional
service may also find it advantageous to “pick sides” while they work in Congress.
108 MALBIN, supra note 7, at 24; see id. at 19–23 (explaining influence of members of R
Congress over future job opportunities of staff); Christine DeGregorio, Staff Utilization in
the U.S. Congress: Committee Chairs and Senior Aides, 28 POLITY 261, 264 (1995) (explaining
that staff must remain in good graces of bosses); DeGregorio & Snider, supra note 83, at R
494, 508 (claiming that staff power is derivative of members); Romzek & Utter, supra note
83, at 424, 435–36; Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover R
and the Ties-That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 383–85 (1981) (concluding that over-
whelming majority of staffers “are tied to a principal or patron”).
109 Romzek & Utter, supra note 83, at 422. R
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comes.110  Although the test of “nonpartisanship” may not be stringent
enough to prevent such persons from becoming part of a nonpartisan staff, it
is not clear that their presence would provide the openness and objectivity
important for the theoretical case.  But this group may also include those
simply committed to seeing enactment of “good” public policy, regardless of
the partisan or ideological direction of the legislative solution.111  The follow-
ing final two Sections of this Part consider some of the potential issues for
this staffer.
D. Preserving the Influence of Nonpartisan Staff
The theoretical case for nonpartisan staff is premised to some extent on
such staff being influential enough in Congress to affect legislative outcomes.
How is the influence of nonpartisan staff best enhanced and preserved?
This question was addressed by Bruce Bimber in describing the experi-
ence of the OTA’s staff.  As discussed in Part I, the OTA was not organized
with the same protection against partisan influence as most of the other legis-
lative support organizations, and it began as a politicized organization.  Dur-
ing its first six years, “[i]t was widely viewed as dedicated to a narrow set of
political interests, and its technical credibility suffered as a result.”112
According to Bimber, the politicization of the office was gradually reduced,
and its credibility and influence enhanced, once it followed strictly a “strategy
of neutrality,” which involved not making specific policy recommenda-
tions.113  The office “refused to endorse specific congressional action.  It pro-
vided a range of policy options, and presented arguments for and against
each, but carefully avoided recommending action.”114
The key to this strategy was to recognize, and take advantage of, the
decentralization of power in the legislature.115  Because Congress has hetero-
geneous political and policy interests, there is space for, and potentially
heightened value derived from, analysis that is perceived as objective.  Analy-
sis so perceived might possibly be persuasive to differing interests on Capitol
Hill, and therefore be more valuable than mere “partisan” analysis that
speaks to (and persuades) only one side.  In describing the GAO’s experi-
ence, Mosher arrived at a similar conclusion.  In contrast to the Bureau of
the Budget (and OMB)—which retained its influence only by becoming par-
tisan offices espousing the views of the administration in power—the GAO
has been able to remain influential despite being nonpartisan in part
110 See id. at 433 (describing career committee staffers who are interested in influencing
public policy “in ways that are consistent with their own policy biases”).
111 See Romzek & Utter, supra note 102, at 1268 (describing how nonpartisan staff pride R
themselves on developing the best policy “as opposed to promoting the positions of either
party”).
112 BIMBER, supra note 67, at 20. R
113 Id. at 66.
114 Id.; see id. at 51, 67 (noting that following the adoption of this strategy, “OTA had
developed into one of the most well-respected analysts of policy in the country”).
115 See id. at 22–24.
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because of the more decentralized power structure in the legislature.116  The
“strategy of neutrality” was the OTA staff’s approach to develop and protect a
reputation for independence and objectivity.
The OTA staff also learned that any contrary strategy was doomed to fail.
If the office made specific policy recommendations, its conclusions would
inevitably satisfy some congressional constituents but not others.  The end
result, however, would not be balanced because “[l]egislators with reason to
object . . . could make trouble for the agency that far outweighed whatever
accolades might come from those whose position the agency might have sup-
ported.  Favoritism did not seem to pay; a better approach was to offer some-
thing for everyone.”117  Thus, as a practical matter, the OTA really could not
afford to be anything other than neutral.118
Much the same strategy was adopted by the CBO when it was first organ-
ized.  Alice Rivlin, the office’s first director, understood that it was not
enough to produce fair and objective analysis; to be influential, the CBO had
to maintain such a reputation in Congress.  Thus, although she accepted the
fact that CBO analyses would inevitably be used for partisan purposes, she
thought it critical that the office never be branded as partisan.  Her solution
was to have the office avoid making policy recommendations.  In her view, if
it made such recommendations, “ ‘there would be no way to resist political
pressure or the perception that [the CBO] succumbed to political pressure.’”119  She
distinguished policy recommendations from “technical” recommendations,
which the office would provide to Congress.120
This “strategy of neutrality” raises a number of questions.  For one thing,
as Malbin has pointed out, a commitment to make “no policy recommenda-
116 See MOSHER, supra note 54, at 181. R
117 BIMBER, supra note 67, at 59; see id. at 66.
118 See id. at 67 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch reaching that conclusion).
119 JOYCE, supra note 77, at 29 (emphasis added) (quoting Alice Rivlin).  Stanley Surrey R
has described the task of serving effectively members of Congress from different parties
and chambers, and with different ideologies, as like “living in a constant state of tension.”
Stanley S. Surrey, Tribute to Dr. Laurence N. Woodworth: Two Decades of Federal Tax History
Viewed from This Perspective, 32 NAT’L TAX J. 227, 234 (1979).
120 The CBO’s current website states that “CBO does not make policy recommenda-
tions.” Overview, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/overview (last visited
Apr. 4, 2013).  The JCT staff seems to have had a similar experience.  Larry Woodworth,
the person who is generally considered its most successful Chief of Staff, has described a
process of laying out all of the options for members of Congress but not making any rec-
ommendations. See Manley, supra note 84, at 1052 (describing Woodworth’s position). R
His successor has also drawn a distinction between policy and “technical” recommenda-
tions because “‘there’s no side in technical revisions.’” MALBIN, supra note 7, at 184 (quot- R
ing Bob Shapiro, Woodworth’s successor).  During one period when the staff was asked to
be more of a policy advocate, its overall influence apparently declined. See id. at 179–81
(describing changed role of staff when Rep. Al Ullman (D.-Ore.) became chair of Ways &
Means); Malbin, supra note 87, at 22–24. But see REESE, supra note 62, at 77–81 (describing R
methods by which JCT staff in fact made policy recommendations); Surrey, supra note 119, R
at 230 (describing Woodworth’s actions when he encountered tax recommendations “that
he did not share”).
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tions” may be quite misleading.  Although a nonpartisan office may not spe-
cifically advocate a particular course of action, it may do the equivalent by
laying out “technical” objections to all but one or two options.121  Staff policy
views may also be infused (either intentionally or inadvertently) into congres-
sional debate more subtly, such as by deciding how the questions of an analy-
sis are framed, what models are used, how data is interpreted, and how
results are presented.122  Even the order in which various options are
presented to Congress may have policy implications.123  Similarly, bill-draft-
ers—even if sincere in being agnostic towards policy—no doubt must make
choices in their work that ultimately help to decide policy for Congress.
In addition, a “no policy recommendations” rule may simply be infeasi-
ble.  To illustrate, consider the task of estimating the budget consequences of
legislative proposals, one of the important duties currently delegated by Con-
gress to nonpartisan staff.  Under current budget accounting rules, staff are
not given the luxury of providing a typical economist’s “two-handed”
response when confronted with an issue involving a high degree of uncer-
tainty.  Staff are also generally not allowed to give a range of the estimated
budget consequences, such as a confidence interval.  Instead, the current
rules generally require “point” estimates of the budget effects of a proposal
in each of a specified number of years following enactment of the proposal.
To make those estimates, staff must make choices on matters that may not be
well-resolved in the professional literature.124
This type of judgment might be viewed as a “technical” rather than a
“policy” recommendation, but the two questions are sometimes intertwined.
For example, in 1990, the first Bush Administration made a legislative propo-
sal to reduce the taxation of capital gains, which then (as now) was a very
contentious policy issue on Capitol Hill (controlled at the time by Demo-
crats).  The two scorekeepers—the Treasury and the JCT—differed on the
projected revenue effect of the change, with the Treasury estimating that it
would raise revenue and the JCT estimating the opposite.125  Upon examina-
tion, it was determined that a slight difference in one parameter (the esti-
mated elasticity of taxpayer response to a change in the capital gains rate)—a
121 See MALBIN, supra note 7, at 218–19. R
122 See BIMBER, supra note 67, at 97. R
123 See REESE, supra note 62, at 77–78; Michael J. Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative R
Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 VA. L. REV. 1389, 1420 n.101 (1972).
124 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-46-11, SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC
MODELS AND ESTIMATING PRACTICES OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 3
(2011) (describing budget process requirements); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, JCX-1-05, OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED
BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 3 (2005) (same); BIMBER, supra note
67, at 86 (“[S]ince the result of much of [CBO’s] work is numerical . . . equivocation is R
more difficult.”); MALBIN, supra note 7, at 197 (“At some point, the economists must settle R
on something and use it.”); id. at 203 (describing infeasibility of staff simply laying out
budget assumptions and allowing members to decide).
125 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-10-90, PROPOSALS AND ISSUES RELAT-
ING TO TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 15–16 (1990).
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disagreement within the range of professional knowledge at the time—
explained the different budget consequences.126  Yet, given the importance
of budget rules, this “technical” difference had a clear potential impact on
the policy that would be approved by Congress.
By addressing how staff work is perceived, the “strategy of neutrality” also
introduces a new consideration—the views of the persons whose perception
matters (i.e., the members of Congress).  This raises the possibility that what
is “neutral” and objective is a relative term; as the identity of those making
the judgment changes, the concept of “neutrality” might also change.127
The OTA’s decision to avoid taking sides on policy issues, but instead to
reach results that “offer something for everyone,”128 suggests exactly this type
of balancing.  Moreover, describing the concept of “being neutral” as a mat-
ter of strategic choice (to protect the turf and influence of the nonpartisan
institution) seems somewhat distant from its being a distinctive, inherent attri-
bute of nonpartisan staff that contributes to its special expertise necessary for
the theoretical case.129
Finally, a strategy of neutrality may be contrary to the goals of the non-
partisan staff performing the work.  Recall that one possible motivation for
staff is simply to see that “good” public policy is enacted.130  Would they be
satisfied if their role were reduced to being, in effect, “policy eunuch[s]”
under a strict strategy of neutrality?131  Although they may have no strong
commitments to political party or ideology, they may well have clear ideas
about the comparative merits of various solutions from a policy
standpoint.132
In the end, the OTA’s strategy to retain influence on Capitol Hill proved
unsuccessful, for the office was defunded following the Republican takeover
126 See Jane G. Gravelle, Can a Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself?, 48 TAX NOTES 209,
209–15 (1990).
127 Cf. Malbin, supra note 87, at 24 (suggesting that JCT staff’s recommendations were R
consistent with moderate views of tax-writing committees at the time).
128 BIMBER, supra note 67, at 59; see supra note 117 and accompanying text. R
129 Bimber was explicit that the “neutrality” of the office was a form of subterfuge, and
not an inherent attribute of the staff: “It is not the case that experts at OTA had no values,
no opinions, no position on policies.  What is interesting is that the agency chose not to
reveal those positions in its work.” BIMBER, supra note 67, at 97. R
130 See REESE, supra note 62, at 66 (describing the strong desire of Larry Woodworth, R
former JCT Chief of Staff, “to influence the nation’s future tax laws” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
131 Manley, supra note 84, at 1056 (stating that “it may be unrealistic to ask any man to R
be a policy eunuch”).
132 Another problem with a strategy of neutrality is ensuring that all staff strictly adhere
to the policy.  The flat organizational structure of most Hill staffs, combined with a very fast
pace of activity, creates many opportunities for individual staffers to interact directly and
informally with congressional constituents.  Thus, there is certainly the possibility of indi-
vidual staffers providing analysis and policy recommendations to individual members of
Congress even as the staff as a whole attempts to pursue a strategy of neutrality.  This would
be tempting behavior if staff are inclined to be policy activists and therefore become frus-
trated with the neutrality stance of their office.
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of Congress in 1994.133  Bimber has suggested that the decision was merely a
symbolic prize of the Republican budget-cutters, with OTA losing out “not
because [its budget] was too large, but because it was so tiny.”134  This expla-
nation is not very satisfactory, however; in the same year, for example, the
appropriation for the JCT (which survived) was only about thirty percent of
OTA’s.135  A different explanation is that the 1994 election dramatically
changed the landscape in Congress, and that what may have appeared to be
“neutral” prior to it may not have been perceived that way after it.136  It is
also possible that the election centralized power in Congress, at least initially,
and that OTA’s strategy—founded on a decentralized governing organiza-
tion—then became less effective.137  Serious deficiencies of the office may
have contributed even more to its demise.138  But this experience is a
reminder of yet another issue limiting the independence and influence of
nonpartisan staff in Congress: the control of their purse strings by partisans.
All that said, probably the most troubling aspect of a “strategy of neutral-
ity” is its implications for the expertise of nonpartisan staff.  That issue is
taken up in the last Section.
133 See BIMBER, supra note 67, at 69. R
134 Id. at 77; see id. at 71.
135 The OTA appropriation was about $20 million whereas the JCT’s was about $6 mil-
lion. See id. at 71; John Godfrey, Archer Calls for No Cuts to JCT Budget, 66 TAX NOTES 1095
(1995).
136 See Vary Coates, Book Review, 53 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 309, 312
(1996) (reviewing BIMBER, supra note 67) (suggesting that Republicans may have been R
resentful of OTA analysts, most of whom “almost surely, could have been described as
liberals”); Jeffrey K. Stine, Book Review, 39 TECH. & CULTURE 815, 816 (1998) (reviewing
BIMBER, supra note 67) (noting that “nonpartisan” director of OTA assumed a partisan R
position with Democratic Clinton Administration following demise of office).
137 See Coates, supra note 136, at 311–12; Anne M. Khademian, Book Review, 16 J. R
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 492, 496 (1997) (reviewing BIMBER, supra note 67). R
138 For example, the office’s reports took an average of two years to complete. See
BIMBER, supra note 67, at 34, 80.  On Capitol Hill, two years may be an eternity.  As one R
observer has noted:
[A]s often as not, when the report was finished, the requesting committee was no
longer much interested—hearings had been held, the legislation written or the
contending stakeholders placated, or the time for action had gone by.  Often the
staff members who had asked for the study . . . were no longer on the staff.  Some-
times the member in whose name the request was made was also gone . . . .
Coates, supra note 136, at 311; see also James A. Thurber, Policy Analysis on Capitol Hill: Issues R
Facing the Four Analytic Support Agencies of Congress, 6 POL’Y STUD. J. 101, 108 (1977) (quoting
comment that OTA reports are often “‘delivered long past the point of great usefulness’”
(citation omitted)).  There also seems to be some question regarding how valuable the
office’s work was, apart from its lack of timeliness. See BIMBER, supra note 67, at 94 (“[O]ne R
must peer through a strong microscope to see a direct connection between the agency’s
research and the outcome of most public policies.”); LAMBRO, supra note 67, at 248 R
(describing OTA’s studies as “duplicative, frequently shoddy, not altogether objective, and
often ignored”).
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E. Utilizing the Expertise of Nonpartisan Staff
If taken seriously, a strategy of neutrality may simply leave a void in Con-
gress.  The legislative process involves a constant battle of ideas between the
branches, the two chambers, the parties, and public and private interests, and
most participants in that struggle generally do not present their views in a
“neutral” fashion.  Thus, to engage effectively in that debate, Congress (par-
ticularly the committees) needs the assistance of staff who can reach conclu-
sions and make recommendations among the onslaught of arguments and
proposals presented.  Indeed, as we have seen, this was one of the principal
reasons why Congress authorized professional staff for the committees in the
first place.139  Yet, under a strategy of neutrality, nonpartisan staff potentially
“pass into the background whenever a really ‘hot’ issue comes up,”140 pre-
sumably to be replaced by partisan staff.141  In effect, a strategy of neutrality
forces nonpartisan staff to surrender some of their expertise.  They would
still be able to gather information for Congress and identify the possible pros
and cons of various options.  But their critical ability to weigh the advantages
and disadvantages—which might lead to conclusions and recommendations
broadly persuasive in Congress—would be lost.  In short, a strategy of neu-
trality is justified as a way for nonpartisan staff to retain their influence, but
the question is: influence to do what?142
This issue arose prominently in connection with a disagreement between
the CRS and Louis Fisher, a constitutional law expert on separation-of-powers
issues who worked as a senior specialist at CRS from 1970 until 2006.143  In
2003, Fisher published an academic article sharply critical of the decision to
go to war in Iraq.144  CRS analysts are allowed to publish outside writings on
controversial matters, including issues within the analyst’s area of specializa-
tion with CRS, but only if they explicitly disassociate their views from those of
the CRS and the Library of Congress.145  Fisher’s article criticized the Bush
139 See MALBIN, supra note 7, at 5 (asserting that without committee staffs, “Congress R
would quickly become the prisoner of its outside sources of information in the executive
branch and interest groups”); supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
140 GROSS, supra note 10, at 282; see id. at 421–22; MALBIN, supra note 7, at 204 (claim- R
ing that nonpartisan staff who merely lay out options or suggest possible compromises
“have an easier time maintaining their nonpartisan credibility but, however useful they
may be, . . . seem to be unable to serve all of Congress’s needs”).
141 Even if all committee staff were nonpartisan, there would undoubtedly remain some
partisan staff in Congress, such as those serving congressional leadership, the party
caucuses, and individual members.
142 See Malbin, supra note 87, at 25 (“Congress would not be helping itself if it hired R
experts and then asked them to shed their expertise in the name of neutrality.”).
143 Fisher is the author of twenty books and hundreds of articles, and has testified
before congressional committees about fifty times. See Louis Fisher, CATO INSTITUTE, http:/
/www.cato.org/people/louis-fisher (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
144 See Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 118 POL. SCI. Q.
389 (2003).
145 See LIBRARY OF CONG. REG. 2023-3, § 3(B) (1998) (covering “Outside Employment
and Activities”).
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Administration for providing flimsy and inconsistent justifications for using
military force in Iraq.146  It also faulted Congress—especially the Demo-
crats—for allowing political considerations to dictate their response to pres-
sures from the executive branch.147  Fisher concluded that in passing the
Iraq resolution in October 2002, Congress transferred the decision to go to
war to the executive branch and thereby failed to uphold its constitutional
responsibility.148  Although Fisher’s analysis came after the pertinent events
had occurred, it was potentially instructive for future cases involving the same
issue.
In January 2004, CRS Director Daniel Mulhollan issued an agency-wide
“Director’s Statement” on “outside activities” that implored CRS staff to avoid
even the appearance that we have our own agenda as an agency; that one or
more of our analysts might be seen as so set in their personal views that they
are no longer to be trusted to provide objective research and analysis; or that
some have developed a reputation for supporting a position on an issue to
the extent that CRS is rendered “suspect” to those on the other side.149
He concluded that staff should “think carefully before taking a public posi-
tion on matters for which you are responsible . . . [and] do so in full obser-
vance of the neutrality required of your work here.”150
Eight days later, Fisher responded to Mulhollan.  Even though the Direc-
tor’s Statement expressly concerned only “outside activities” by analysts,
Fisher explained that the directive could be applied with equal force to work
done for CRS itself.  Fisher questioned whether a goal of “neutrality” was
consistent with the mission of the service:
No one disputes that our work must be non-partisan.  But if the front
office puts the emphasis on neutrality, balance, and even-handedness, there
is little room for careful, expert analysis. . . . Objectivity means looking at all
the relevant material and presenting a report that has integrity, credibility,
and logic.  “Neutral” and “balanced” writing implies that we take no posi-
tions and reach no conclusions.  We should do more than merely identify
arguments on each side of an issue and leave it to a congressional office to
figure out the rest.  Professional analysis means that we evaluate an issue on
the weight of the evidence.  Otherwise, we fall back on “she says this, he says
146 See Fisher, supra note 144, at 390–95. R
147 Id. at 397–98, 403, 405–07.
148 Id. at 407, 410.
149 DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DIRECTOR’S STATEMENT, OUTSIDE
ACTIVITIES: PRESERVING OBJECTIVITY AND NON-PARTISANSHIP 1 (2004).  Although Mulhol-
lan’s statement refers only to “[r]ecent incidents” and does not mention Fisher or his
article by name, the statement was apparently motivated by that article and the reaction to
it. Id.; see LOUIS FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 290–92 (2011).
Fisher eventually received a “memo of rebuke” from Mulhollan.  Among other things,
Fisher’s article did not include the required disclaimer. See Letter from Louis Fisher,
Senior Specialist, Cong. Research Serv., to Daniel Mulhollan, Dir., Cong. Research Serv. 1
(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/gp/gp-lfisher-20060118.pdf.
150 MULHOLLAN, supra note 149, at 2. R
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that” descriptive writing . . . with no opportunity to fulfill . . . our “reputation
for excellence.”151
Moreover, Fisher doubted that Mulhollan’s message was consistent with
what Congress wanted or needed from the CRS.152  He noted that in today’s
environment, there is much information readily available to congressional
offices through simple Lexis/Nexis or Google searches.  What Congress
needed from CRS was not merely a description of an issue’s pros and cons,
but rather the expertise and judgment of their analysts to evaluate the
information:
In my prepared statements at congressional hearings, I regularly take posi-
tions on institutional and constitutional questions.  I reach those positions
based on analysis of available information and theories.  I am invited to tes-
tify because I have a position. . . . The expectation is not that what I say will
please everyone, but that what I say is constructive, well grounded, and con-
tributes to the legislative debate.153
The Congressional Research Employees Association (CREA), a labor
organization representing some employees at CRS, issued a statement sup-
portive of Fisher’s position:
[M]erely because a staffer has reached a conclusion or has an opinion on a
public policy matter in outside writing which is based upon nonpartisan,
independent[,] and generally accepted methodologies of analysis and schol-
arship, does not indicate that one is no longer “objective” nor “unbiased” on
that subject. . . . [W]hen one’s outside writings, and the opinions and con-
clusions contained therein, are drawn from and based upon a fair considera-
tion, analysis[,] and application of the known facts and of the appropriate,
competing theories and hypotheses, such writings and conclusions are
“objective” by definition.154
The Fisher dispute highlights the potential paradox faced by nonparti-
san staff working in Congress.  Fisher and CREA focused on the type of work
qualifying as objective and nonpartisan—it should draw from “fair considera-
tion” of “known facts” as well as “appropriate, competing theories and
151 Memorandum from Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist, Cong. Research Serv., to Daniel
P. Mulhollan, Dir., Cong. Research Serv. 2 (Jan. 31, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/fisher013104.pdf.  According to Fisher, the statutory mission of CRS since at least
1970 is to provide analysis and reach conclusions. See FISHER, supra note 149, at 289–90,
293; cf. THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECTIVITY IS NOT NEUTRALITY 150–53 (1998) (contrasting
objectivity and neutrality).
152 Cf. Price, supra note 92, at 335–36 (questioning whether Congress is well served by R
neutral and nonpartisan staff).
153 Memorandum from Louis Fisher to Daniel P. Mulhollan, supra note 151, at 3 R
(emphasis in original).
154 Position Statement, Congr. Research Emps. Ass’n, Outside Writing, Lecturing Activ-
ities by CRS Staff: Objectivity 3–4 (May 12, 2004) (emphases in original), available at http:/
/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/crea051204.pdf; see also Position Restatement, Congr. Research
Emps. Ass’n, CREA on Outside Writing (Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.creaunion.
org/Documents/CREA%20on%20Outside%20Writing.pdf (restating importance of
outside writing’s contribution to public discourse).
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hypotheses” and employ “generally accepted methodologies of analysis and
scholarship.”  All of these characteristics might be considered necessary to
have the distinctive expertise that is critical to the theoretical case.  Mulhol-
lan, however, as well as the OTA and CBO before him, focused on another
part of the theoretical case—the need for staff to be influential in the legisla-
tive process.  To Mulhollan (as well as to the OTA and CBO), to retain influ-
ence in a highly partisan environment like Congress, the staff’s work must be
“neutral” so that it does not appear to be biased or partisan.  Yet, as Fisher
pointed out, such a stance would seem to be inconsistent with the full utiliza-
tion of the nonpartisan staff person’s expertise (and therefore would dimin-
ish such person’s ability to reduce gridlock under the theoretical case).155
Another recent dispute, also involving the CRS, may illustrate the same
tension between influence and expertise.  A CRS economic report analyzing
the relationship, if any, between top federal income tax rates and economic
growth, was withdrawn by the office following objections raised about the
report’s findings.156  The CRS director, Mary Mazanec, indicated that the
report was withdrawn so that it could include “more extensive documenta-
tion and explanation of the methodology underlying the economic analy-
sis.”157  The report was issued, however, just six weeks prior to a presidential
election in which the topic of the report was a key point of disagreement
between the candidates, and some observers suggested that the report was
withdrawn in response to political objections as well as possible concern over
its impact on the CRS’s budget.158
155 Following another dispute, Fisher was transferred out of CRS in 2006 and reas-
signed to the Law Library at the Library of Congress.  In 2010, Fisher retired from govern-
ment service and is currently a Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project, a non-
profit think tank that makes bipartisan policy recommendations on constitutional issues.
See Brief for Louis Fisher and Morton Rosenberg as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee, Davis v. Billington, No. 11-5092 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2011), at 5, available at http://
www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/90911_morris-
davisamici_louisfishermortonrosenberg.pdf; Louis Fisher, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
http://www.constitutionproject.org/bio/louis-fisher (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
156 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECON-
OMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945 (2012); Jonathan Weisman,
Tax Report Withdrawn at Request of G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2012, at B1, available at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/questions-raised-on-withdrawal-of-congres-
sional-research-services-report-on-tax-rates.html.
157 Letter from Mary B. Mazanec, Dir., Cong. Research Serv., to the Hon. Sander M.
Levin, U.S. House of Representatives (D.-Mich.) (Nov. 6, 2012), available at http://levin.
house.gov/sites/levin.house.gov/files/documents/Resources/pdf/CRS%20first%20res
ponse%20to%20Levin%2011-6.pdf.
158 See Bruce Bartlett, How Not to Refute a Tax Study You Don’t Like, 137 TAX NOTES 1007,
1011 (2012) (suggesting possible impact on CRS’s budget); Editorial, Congressional Research
Hit Job, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2012, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203880704578086771452127606.html; Eric Kroh, CRS Faces Allegations
of Bias, 137 TAX NOTES 714, 714 (2012) (attributing withdrawal to objections raised by
Senate Republicans); Weisman, supra note 156, at B1 (same).  Citing the confidentiality of R
CRS’s relationship with its congressional constituents, Director Mazanec refused to con-
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CRS eventually released essentially the same report, with its conclusions
moderated very slightly, in December 2012 (about five weeks after the elec-
tion).159  Thus, unlike the Fisher dispute, this incident did not involve the
conclusive nature of the report’s findings.  Moreover, since there was almost
no legislative activity during the period between the two reports, the delayed
release does not seem to have affected any legislative outcomes.160  Neverthe-
less, in another circumstance, the timing of a report can have a critical
impact on legislative decision-making.  Thus, if the timing of this report was
affected by political considerations, the incident demonstrates how easily the
views of nonpartisan staff can be removed from legislative debate—and the
staff’s impact on gridlock compromised—in order to protect the influence of
the office utilizing a strategy of neutrality.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has outlined some of the issues presented if nonpartisan pro-
fessional staffs are used to help reduce gridlock in Congress.  A theoretical
case in favor of such staff assumes that they have an expertise distinct from
that of partisans and are also influential enough to affect legislative out-
comes.  This Essay has explored practical and conceptual questions about
each condition.  The meaning of “nonpartisan” is somewhat nebulous and
incomplete, and it may be difficult to identify, select, and retain persons with
the attributes necessary to support the theoretical case.  Staff incentives dur-
ing congressional service may further undermine the existence of those
attributes.  Finally, the Essay suggests that the two components of the theoret-
ical case—a distinctive expertise and the existence of sufficient congressional
influence—may to some extent be incompatible with one another.  If non-
partisan staff must be “neutral” on policy issues in order to maintain their
influence in Congress’s partisan environment, they may, in effect, be forced
to surrender some of their expertise—their ability to analyze and persuade
(in a manner different from partisans) why certain policy options are prefera-
firm or deny whether there had been any congressional request to retract the report. See
Letter from Mary B. Mazanec, Dir., Cong. Research Serv., to the Hon. Sander M. Levin,
U.S. House of Representatives (D.-Mich.) (Nov. 16, 2012) http://levin.house.gov/sites/
levin.house.gov/files/documents/Resources/pdf/CRS%20second%20reponse%20to%20
Levin%2011-16.pdf.
159 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECON-
OMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945 (UPDATED) (2012); Eric
Kroh, CRS Reaffirms Controversial Report on Taxes and Economy, 137 TAX NOTES 1280 (2012).
160 It was reasonably clear at the time the first report was issued that Congress would be
in session for at most one more week prior to the election, and there seemed little likeli-
hood that the topic addressed by the report would be a matter for immediate legislative
action. See Alan K. Ota, Leaving Town Early, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 10, 2012, at 1816, available at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport112-000004147999.  In that regard, the
controversial timing of the first report would seem to have been largely a self-inflicted
wound by the CRS, whose mission is to work exclusively for Congress. See Congressional
Research Service Careers, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo (last visited Apr. 4,
2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 35 19-JUN-13 12:50
2013] legislative  gridlock &  nonpartisan  staff 2321
ble to others.  This “muted” expertise may impair any effect they might have
on reducing gridlock.
In the end, the Essay illustrates the importance of considering the con-
text of any change.  So long as Congress remains sharply divided along parti-
san lines, it is unclear whether reducing the partisan influence over some
aspect of Congress can have much impact.  Moreover, the “theoretical case”
presupposes the existence of legislative solutions that, for some reason, are
not being developed and seriously considered by Congress.  But if Congress’s
divisions merely reflect those of the broader society, this underlying assump-
tion may not be valid.161
161 Cf. Nivola & Galston, supra note 6, at 238 (reminding that some polarizing pressures R
have emanated from the bottom).
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